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Abstract Using threshold effects we find that as countries experience an increase
in old-age dependency rates, countries with lower domestic saving rates, moder-
ate current account deficits, and are more open to trade can actually experience
an increase in GDP growth rates. These countries have greater access to capital
markets which will allow them to sustain economic growth in light of substantial
increases in their old-age dependency rates. Countries with a lower savings rate
are able to rely on domestic consumption and more importantly can rely on for-
eign investment to offset the decline in worker productivity caused by exodus of
domestic workers. Although the effects of an increase in the old-age dependency
rate on GDP growth rates are smaller for countries with lower saving rates, these
countries also have significantly lower growth rates prior to the increase in the
old-age dependency rate. We conclude the effects of population ageing for many
high saving countries will depend on their desire to reduce saving rates at old-
age dependency rates begin to increase. The ability for lower saving countries to
maintain stable growth rates hinges on their ability to sustain current account
deficits.
JEL Classification: J11, O40, O57
Keywords Dependency Rates · Growth · Ageing · Saving Rates · Capital Mobility
1 Introduction
Over the past several decades, OECD countries have experienced an increase in
old-age dependency rates due to extended life expectancy and increasing birth
rates during the middle of the 20th century. As the first cohort of baby boomers
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are beginning to leave the work force several economies with already high old-
age dependency rates will face further increases in their old-age dependency ra-
tio. In the next twenty years the old-age dependency ratio (measured relative to
the working age population) will nearly double for the United States and many
western European countries. As the ratio of retirees to the working age popula-
tion increases, economic growth and national saving rates will by impacted. Many
economists agree that national savings rates will decline in response to increasing
old-age dependency as the ratio of dissavers to savers increases commensurate with
the increases in the old-age dependency ratio. In theory, few economists would dis-
miss this demographic change as insubstantial in terms of the impacts to economic
growth. The primary aim of this paper is to answer the question: To what extent
does an population ageing, as seen through growth in the old-age dependency ra-
tio, affect GDP growth rates conditional on a country’s level of saving, capital
mobility, and access to foreign capital markets?
Using a threshold procedure following Hansen (1999) we test for the existence of
threshold effects in the relationship between population ageing and GDP growth
rates. We find significant thresholds for domestic saving rates, current account
balances, and trade openness. After controlling for these thresholds the effects of
population ageing on economic are positive for countries with a lower domestic
savings rates, moderate current account deficits, and more open to trade. We at-
tribute the positive relationship as a country’s population moves out of the labor
force, saving rates decline which causes consumption to increase. More impor-
tantly countries with moderate current account deficits are able to attract foreign
investment from higher saving countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will outline the relevant
literature relating to economic growth and population ageing and the effects of
population ageing on country saving rates. Section 3 will review the threshold
procedure outlined in Hansen (1999) and the baseline growth regressions used
throughout the analysis. Section 4 will review the results. Finally, section 5 will
conclude.
2 Literature Review
At the center of this demographic analysis are two separate yet related groups
of empirical studies. In the first tier, researchers have studied the correlation be-
tween old-age dependency rates and domestic saving rates. Modigliani and Sterling
(1983), Horioka (1992), and Graham (1987) confirmed the negative correlation be-
tween old-age dependency rates and the domestic saving rates initially posited in
the life-cycle theory of consumption. Following the seminal work of Leff (1969),
many empirical studies, including those of Bilsborrow (1979), Weil (1994), and Li
et al (2007), have studied the effects of demographic transitions on savings. In gen-
eral, the empirical studies conducted to extrapolate the effects of age dependency
on savings yield a negative correlation. These results are robust to time spans,
countries, and empirical specifications considered within the literature.
In the second tier of the literature, empirical studies have been directed at
the link between old-age dependency rates and real economic growth. Despite
a small number of dissenters that claim demographic changes are too subtle to
affect economic growth, there is a relative consensus within the economic literature
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regarding the negative correlation between old-age dependency rates and economic
growth. Using a human-capital augmented Solow growth model, Modigliani (1970)
found a negative correlation between the population share for old-age dependents
and the per worker growth rate of real GDP over a panel of the OECD countries.
Lindh and Malmberg (1999), Masson et al (1998), and Graham (1987) confirm
the results found by Modigliani (1970) using aggregate, time-series data in cross-
country studies. This result is consistent with mainstream economic theory: fewer
workers in the economy will result in a slowdown in production and a decline
in GDP growth. Lindh and Malmberg (1999) find a positive effect on economic
growth for an increase in the 50-64 year old-age group but a negative effect for an
increase in the 65+ age grouping.
Contrary to the work of Modigliani (1970), Cutler et al (1990) show an optimal
response to population ageing maybe a reduction in national saving rates for the
United States. Their arguments center on a slowdown in the rate of population
growth which will require less investment in capital to equip the shrinking working
age population. This will further allow for greater inflows of foreign capital. The
results found by Cutler et al (1990) are dependent on a country’s ability to access
foreign capital. Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) first examine the optimal path of
consumption for an ageing population under the assumptions of a small open or a
large closed economy. They find the optimal response for a small open economy is
to smooth consumption, which will possible lead to an increase in domestic saving
rates. For a large closed economy they find the optimal response is a decrease in
saving, which is consistent with Cutler et al (1990). Finally, Guest (2006) expands
on the results of Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000) by allowing for differing degrees of
capital market openness. Under the assumption of imperfect capital mobility he
finds a small responsiveness in domestic interest rates to foreign capital is sufficient
to generate optimal consumption and saving paths similar to that of the closed
economy.
The work by Cutler et al (1990), Guest (2006), and Elmendorf and Sheiner
(2000) analyze how a country should respond, preemptively, to an ageing popula-
tion. Instead of searching for the optimal responses in consumption and saving, we
are interested in understanding the effects of ageing on growth rates conditional on
a countries level of saving. While researchers have conducted many empirical stud-
ies to gauge the proper magnitude of the resulting shock on economic growth, we
feel that these results may be inaccurate and misleading, as the body of economic
literature does little to compensate for the diverse levels of domestic savings, cur-
rent account balances, and levels of openness within the OECD grouping. Given
the varying degrees of key economic variables it is difficult to conclusively state
whether the impact of ageing on GDP growth will be of the same magnitude for
all countries. Intuition suggests that countries with a high-savings profile will be
better prepared to absorb the impacts of an ageing population, while the coun-
tries with a low-savings profile may suffer more dire consequences as an already
low savings rate declines further. This is often cited when discussing the current
low savings rate in the United States. Conversely, Japan’s national savings rates
are above 35% and according to conventional logic was in position to absorb the
large number of retirees without a slowdown in growth. Ultimately, the high saving
rates did not shield the country from a growth slowdown.
Most empirical research has been limited to the relationship between savings
caused by an ageing population or the effects of ageing on GDP growth rates. By
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conducting a threshold analysis on savings, capital mobility, and trade openness
within a standard growth regression we will control for the varying degrees of these
key economic variables. Through this paper, we hope to expand the literature on
the economic consequences of ageing by utilizing a non-dynamic threshold analysis
procedure created by Hansen (1999). This approach will allow us to illuminate
the effects of ageing on GDP growth conditional on the level of savings, capital
mobility, and openness in a country. By utilizing this threshold approach, we will
divide the OECD sample into regimes based on a particular threshold variable
(saving rate, current account balances, or trade openness). By establishing these
regimes, we are able to isolate the economic impacts of ageing on GDP growth
rates among the various OECD countries.
We find the effects of ageing on real GDP growth is positive for countries that
have low domestic saving rates, negative current account balances, and are more
open to trade. We attribute these findings to an increase in consumption upon
retirement that counteracts the loss in initial productive capacity that is actualized
by a smaller workforce. These results are consistent with the hypotheses of Cutler
et al (1990), Elmendorf and Sheiner (2000), and Guest (2006). We also find within
the high-saving regime, the impacts of an increase in the old-age dependency
ratio on real GDP growth is significant and negative. We attribute this negative
relationship to the fact that countries with a high level of national savings forgo this
consumption boost due to cultural factors that increase the inertia of savings at the
individual level - such as cultural expectations for families to financially provide
for the elderly or expectations of the elderly to leave large bequests. Consequently,
the high-savers suffer the consequences of a reduced workforce without significant
changes in consumption. Although, for low saving countries, our results show a
positive relationship between growth and old-age dependency ratio, this does not
imply a high rate of growth. Countries in the lowest saving threshold have an
average growth rate of 1.6%, whereas countries in the high saving threshold have
an average growth rate of 2.9%.
3 Empirical Methodology
Recent research (e.g. Guest (2006), Hock and Weil (2011), and Cervellati and
Sunde (2011)) focuses on how domestic saving rates should respond to an ageing
population not how GDP growth responds to a change in population ageing for a
given level of saving (or capital mobility and trade openness). To test the latter
we implement a non-dynamic panel threshold testing procedure that allows us to
model the relationship between population ageing and GDP growth while simul-
taneously controlling for country specific factors. Most growth regressions assume
a constant coefficient on population ageing (see Li et al (2007)), but it is reason-
able to suspect the coefficient on ageing will vary based on a countries level of
saving, current account balances, and trade openness. One approach to control for
differing levels of saving, current account balances, and trade openness would be
an ad hoc exogenous grouping. A more optimal approach would be to search for
the break point among the variable of interest (i.e. saving rates, current account
balances, and trade openness) that minimizes the residual sum of squares.
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Before implementing the threshold testing procedure we develop five simple
growth regressions applied to OECD countries.1 Focusing on highly developed
economies will help control for hard to measure factors that plague large coun-
try panel datasets. One such measure would be the development of a country’s
financial system. Most OECD countries have a highly developed financial system
and are able to borrow through domestic and external channels. Using only OECD
countries our baseline empirical specification follows closely from Barro and i Mar-
tin (2003) and Li et al (2007):
gyit = µi + α1log(ageworking)it + α2log(1 + labor force growth)it
+ α3log(1 + population growth)it + α4log(per capita income)i,t−1
+ α5log(S/Y )i,t−1 + α6log(G/Y )i,t−1 + eit, (1)
where gyit is the growth rate measured as per capita, U.S. dollars, and (S/Y )i,t−1
and (G/Y )i,t−1 are domestic saving rates and government consumption as a per-
centage of GDP, respectively. Following the growth literature we expect α1 > 0,
α2 > 0, α3 < 0, α4 < 0, α5 > 0, and α6 < 0.
2 GDP growth rates are typically
increasing in the size of the labor force which we capture by including the working
age population and labor force growth rates. Since we are measuring the growth
rate of GDP per capita, it follows that population growth will have a negative
effect on growth rates. Higher income countries tend to lie closer to their steady
state levels of capital (i.e. lower marginal product of capital), while lower income
countries tend to have faster growth rates due to a higher marginal product of
capital. This effect is captured through α4, the coefficient on lagged per capita
income. Next we included domestic saving rates, we can also see this as a proxy
for investment as the two are highly correlated. Following the growth literature
we expect the coefficient on domestic saving rates to be positive.3 Finally, we
include government consumption as a fraction of GDP. We expect government
consumption to have a negative effect on GDP which follows from Barro (1991).
The next step is to isolate the effects of young-age and old-age workers on GDP
growth rates. To do this we estimate equation (1) replacing log(ageworking) with
log(ageold) and log(ageyoung). The model becomes:
gyit = µi + α11log(ageold)it + α12log(ageyoung)it + · · ·+ eit. (2)
Equation (2) will separate the effects of the working age population into the young
and old-age dependency rates, respectively. For robustness the next step is to cap-
ture the effects of trade and financial openness on growth rates by incorporating a
trade openness measure that captures a countries dependency on foreign markets.
Trade openness is measured as exports plus imports expressed as a percentage of
gross domestic product. This is standard in the growth literature. To control for
financial openness we incorporate a measure by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Financial openness is measured as total foreign assets plus total foreign liabilities
expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product. These are de facto measures
1 Our sample includes 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States.
2 These signs are consistent with the models of Li et al (2007) and Attanasio et al (2000).
3 To avoid a causality debate between saving and GDP growth we include the lag of domestic
saving.
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of openness. They do not necessarily control for whether a country is open or
closed as a matter of law, but instead measure the amount of goods, services, and
financial assets flowing across the borders. Next we incorporate human capital,
life expectancy, and birth rate measures. Human capital is taken as the percent-
age of primary school enrollment. Finally, we incorporate decade specific dummy
variables and country specific fixed effects.
The baseline regressions will help shed light on the bias that results from the
failure to control for the effects of an increase in the working age population on
growth by separating the equation in young and old-age dependent. Nonetheless,
the regression does not provide much insight into the effects of an increase in the
old-age dependency ratio will have on GDP growth conditional on a country’s level
of domestic saving, current account, or trade openness. The threshold variables
are selected in accordance with the research of Cutler et al (1990), Elmendorf and
Sheiner (2000), and Guest (2006).4 In order to better understand the relationship
between growth and an ageing population we proceed to develop the non-dynamic
threshold model by Hansen (1999). The next step requires estimating equation (2)
for threshold effects in domestic saving rates, current account balances, and trade
openness.
The threshold procedure requires comparing the residual sum of squares from
the restricted regression, equation (2), to the unrestricted regression which allows
for a single threshold:
gyit = µi + β0log(ageold)itI(qit ≤ γ) + β1log(ageold)itI(qit > γ)
+ θxit + eit (3)
where qit is a scalar threshold variable (saving rates, current account balances,
or trade openness), xit represents additional control variables from equation (1),
and I(·) is the indicator function that takes a value of one when the threshold
condition in the bracket is satisfied, zero otherwise. The error term is assumed to
be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance σ2.
Mean deviations are taken to control for country specific effects measured by µi.
The sample is trimmed by 15 percent, the bottom and top 7.5 percent are
omitted during the search. Additionally, a threshold regime is restricted to be
at least size 0.075 × N observations. Restricting the threshold regimes to be at
least 7.5 percent of the total observations helps to minimize potential bias caused
by outliers. The optimal threshold value is selected by minimizing the residual
sum of squares. After selecting the optimal threshold value, γ1, it is important to
determine if a threshold effect is statistically significant. The null hypothesis of no
threshold effect is:
H0 : β0 = β1,
where β0 = β1 is tested by a likelihood ratio test. The likelihood ratio test for the





4 We also considered other measures of capital mobility which included the financial openness
measure by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), correlations from the saving-investment regressions
by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), and other de jure measures of capital mobility.
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where σˆ2 = 1n(T−1)S1(γˆ1), S0 are the residual sum of squares from the restricted
regression, S1(γˆ1) are the residual sum of squares from the unrestricted regression,
and γˆ1 is the threshold parameter that minimizes the residual sum of squares. The
null hypothesis is rejected for large values of the likelihood ratio test statistic.
Once the single threshold is estimated the process of estimation extends easily to
models with two and three thresholds breaks.
To determine the second threshold break, the following model is estimated:
gyit = µi + β0log(ageold)itI(qit ≤ γ1) + β1log(ageold)itI(γ1 < qit ≤ γ2)
+ β2log(ageold)itI(γ2 < qit) + θxit + eit (5)
Assuming the first threshold is given, the optimal second-stage threshold estimate
is found by minimizing the residual sum of squares for equation (5). The likelihood





where σˆ2 = S2(γˆ2)/n(T − 1). In order to insure a large enough sample within each
threshold the second break point is restricted to be at least 7.5 percentile points
larger or smaller than the first threshold value. The null hypothesis of β0 = β1 = β2
is rejected for large values F2. The asymptotic distributions for F1 and F2 are
non-standard. Under the null hypothesis the thresholds are not identified, Hansen
suggests a bootstrapping procedure to simulate the asymptotic distribution and
p-values for the likelihood ratio test.5
Since our interest is primarily with the relationship between old-age depen-
dency and GDP growth rates we restrict the thresholds effects to only be interacted
with old-age dependency rates. The data are separated into regimes according to
the threshold variables in relation with the optimal threshold values. We estimate
each growth model outlined previously for thresholds effects.6
4 Data and Results
Data are from three sources: Penn World Table 7.0 (Heston et al (2006)), World
Development Indicators, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). National income
data which includes real GDP per capita, saving rates, government consumption,
and trade openness are from Penn World Table 7.0. Population growth and labor
force growth are also from the Penn World Table. Demographic variables which
include age dependency ratios, life expectancy, birth rates, infant mortality, and
primary school enrollments are from the World Development Indicators. The old-
age dependency rate refers to the population older than 65 relative to the middle
age population between the ages of 15 and 64. The young-age dependency rate
is defined in a similar manner for those under the age of 15. Financial openness
measures are from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). The data set spans from 1970
5 See Hansen (1999) for complete details of the threshold procedure and test statistics.
Graphs of confidence intervals are available upon request.
6 Each model was also tested using three, five, and ten-year rolling averages to control for
business cycle variability, the results were similar.
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to 2007 for 22 OECD countries for a total of 814 observations. A complete data
guide is available in Table 1.7
Detailed descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. Table 2 presents the
mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values of each variable. Ad-
ditionally the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles are also reported.
4.1 Baseline Growth Regressions
Results for the baseline growth regressions are available in Table 3. All regres-
sions include country specific fixed effects and are reported using White’s robust
standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. In the first model we present the
results for the baseline specification, equation (1). The baseline model assumes a
constant coefficient on the working age population. All variables appear with the
expected signs. With the exception of government consumption, the variables are
significant at the five percent level. We can interpret the coefficient of 0.097 on
log(ageworking) as the percentage increase in growth rates for a one percent in-
crease in the working age population. In other words, in order to increase growth
rates by 1%, the ratio of working age residents to the total population would need
to increase by 0.01/0.097 or approximately 10.3%.8
As expected the coefficient on saving rates is positive and significant at the five
percent level. The coefficient of 0.021 on saving rates implies that a one percent
increase in saving rates will increase growth by 0.021 percentage points. This means
in order to increase growth rates by one percentage point domestic saving rates
must be increased by 0.01/0.021 or 47.1%. The coefficient -0.023 on income per
capita also appears with the expected sign and is significant at the one percent
level. The negative coefficient on lagged income per capita is consistent with past
literature and reflects the convergence in GDP growth rates as incomes increase.
The coefficients on labor force growth rates, 0.221, and population growth rates,,
-0.965 enter with the expected signs and are significant at the one percent level.
Since growth rates are measured as the percent change in real GDP per capita we
expect the coefficient on population growth to be near one. A one percent increase
in population growth should result in an equal decline in GDP growth rates, all
else equal. The coefficient on labor force growth rates is also large in magnitude. A
one percent increase in the labor force growth rate will result in a 0.221 percentage
point increase in GDP growth rate. An increase in the labor force growth rate will
correspond with a decrease in the young and/or old population groups.9 In order
to increase GDP growth by one percentage point it will take an increase of 4.5%
in the labor force (0.01/0.221).
7 For some countries during the early 1970’s the data for demographic variables were only
available every five years. Since the threshold procedure requires a balanced panel we inter-
polated the variables for which we were missing observations. This was primarily used for life
expectancy, birth rates, infant mortality, and primary school enrollments. The variance in the
measures we ipolated are rather low, so it is likely the interpolation will not lead to data
smoothing errors.
8 The semi-log coefficients can be interpreted as ∂Y = αi
∂X
X
= αi%∆X. In order to increase
growth rates by 1% the percent change in X needs to be 0.01/αi.
9 There is potentially a multicollinearity issue between variables controlling for age depen-
dency rates, labor force growth, and population growth. When the model is estimated without
labor force and population growth rates the results are quantitatively similar.
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In model (2) we separate the effects of the working age population into the
young and old-age dependency rates. The coefficients on the young and old-age
dependency rates appear with the expected signs -0.039 and -0.016, respectively.
Only the coefficient on the young-age dependency rate is significant. We can inter-
pret these coefficients as a one percent increase in the young (old) age dependency
rate will decrease GDP growth by 0.039 percentage points (0.016). Collectively,
both terms are relatively small in magnitude. This is not surprising given our hy-
pothesis that the effects of ageing on growth will be dependent on a country’s level
of saving, current account balance, and level of openness. We expect the coeffi-
cients on the old-age dependency rate to change significantly after controlling for
the appropriate thresholds. The coefficients on the other variables remain nearly
unchanged.
In model (3) we incorporate measures of trade and financial openness. The
coefficients on trade openness, 0.040, and financial openness, 0.002, appear as
expected and are significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on old-age
dependency rates decreases to 0.001 while there is little change in the coefficient on
young-age dependency rates. With the exception of the coefficients on domestic
saving rates, which is no longer significant, and government spending, which is
negative and significant, at the ten percent level the inclusion of both openness
measures largely leave the results unchanged.
Model (4) includes additional demographic control variables. The coefficient
on life expectancy appears with the expected sign 0.280 and is significant at the
one percent level. Coefficients on primary school enrollments, mortality rates, and
birth rates are insignificant. The coefficients on the other key variables remain
nearly unchanged. Coefficients on domestic saving rates and old-age dependency
rates are now significant at the ten percent level.
Finally, following Lindh and Malmberg (1999) we include decade dummy vari-
ables. These results are shown in model (5). The coefficients on the decade dummy
variables can be interpreted relative to the 2000-2007 period which was omitted
from the regression. The 1970’s had significantly higher growth rates than the
2000’s. The coefficient on old-age dependency rates is significant at the five per-
cent level and financial openness is no longer significant.
Overall, the inclusion of additional control variables has little affect on the
significance and magnitude of the key variables. Across all five models, the coeffi-
cients on old and young-age dependency rates, labor force growth rates, population
growth rates, income per capita, saving rates, and government consumption largely
remain unchanged and retain significance. The coefficient on old-age dependency
rates is largest, in absolute value, for model (5). The coefficient of -0.033 suggests a
one percent change in old-age dependency rates will reduce GDP growth by 0.033
percentage points. In the big picture, a coefficient of -0.033 may appear relatively
small in magnitude, in order for growth rates to fall by one percentage point we
would need an increase of 30 percent in the old-age dependency ratio. For compar-
ison, for the United States the current ratio of old-age dependents to the working
age population is approximately 19 percent (for every 100 people in the labor force
we have 19 people above the age of 65) but with the coming retirement of the baby
boomers the old-age dependency rates will increase to nearly 35 percent by 2030
and over 40 percent by 2055. By 2030 the old-age dependency ratio will increase by
84 percent, all else equal, this will imply nearly a three percentage point reduction
in GDP growth rates. With such profound and potentially harmful effects on GDP
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growth it is necessary to better understand how old-age dependency rates affect
GDP growth.
4.2 Thresholds in Saving Rates
The baseline model is fairly standard within the growth literature (see Barro and
i Martin (2003)). One area the growth literature has not explored is the effects of
ageing on GDP growth conditional on a countries level of saving. There has been
a large amount of research that emphasizes how a country should adjust their
savings rate in response to an ageing population, but this ignores the contempo-
raneous effects of ageing on growth. For example, it might be advisable for some
countries to focus on increasing domestic saving rates, but this could force poli-
cymakers into tough decisions. The threshold approach will allow policymakers to
fully understand the costs of their decisions. The first extension to the baseline
model is to test the relationship of an ageing population on GDP growth rates
conditional on a country’s current savings rate.10
The test statistics for the existence of a single, double, and triple threshold
in saving rates are reported in Table 4. We report the likelihood ratio test statis-
tics, the percentiles and savings values for each threshold, number of observations
within each regime, p-values for the related test statistics, and the critical values
obtained via a bootstrapping procedure.
For the case of a single threshold break, all four models display strong evidence
of a threshold and reject the null hypothesis of no threshold at the one percent
level. Further, all four models jointly conclude the threshold break occurs at 11th
percentile with a savings rate 16.5 percent. The relationship between old-age de-
pendency rates is unique for extremely low saving countries. Given the significance
of a single threshold we proceed to estimate a double threshold model.
The results for the double threshold model are also consistent across models.
All four models have a test statistic that rejects the null hypothesis at the five
or ten percent levels. Similar to the single threshold model, the double threshold
model finds a consistent break across all four models. The second threshold occurs
at the 59th percentile with a savings rate of approximately 24.2 percent. This
threshold occurs slightly above the mean savings rate of 23.5 percent. There are
94 observations in the first regime (lowest saving countries), 383 observations in
the second regime (lower saving countries), and 337 countries in the third regime
(higher saving countries). Finally, we estimate a triple threshold model and find
some evidence of a third threshold in models (1) and (2), but no evidence in the
richer models. The third threshold is found at the 67th percentile, which is just
outside the minimum number of observations we restricted each regime to contain.
This suggests a small number of outliers causing the test statistics to be significant
in the first two models.
We proceed under the assumption of two thresholds for all four models. The
results for these regressions are presented in Table 5. For the complete model
(model 4), Table 6 shows the countries by year for each regime and Table 13
presents the mean values of GDP growth, percent of the population above 65%,
10 We also tested the relationship conditional on a country’s average saving rate over the
previous five and ten years. The results are quantitatively similar.
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savings, consumption, current account balances, and government consumption by
regimes.
The results are rather striking. Across all four models the coefficient on old-
age dependency rates for the lowest saving threshold is positive and significant at
the one percent level. In other words, an increase in the old-age dependency rates
has a positive effect on growth for the lowest saving countries. The coefficient on
the old-age dependency rates across all four models ranges from a low of 0.109
to a high of 0.132. The old-age coefficient for the lower saving countries in the
second regime is positive but statistically insignificant from zero in models (1)
and (2) and negative but statistically insignificant from zero in models (3) and
(4). Finally, the old-age coefficient for the highest saving countries ranges from
-0.003 and insignificant in model (2) to -0.043 and significant at the one percent
level in model (4). The coefficients on the other variables are consistent with the
baseline model we presented in Table 3. Additionally, we report the F-test statistics
for equality among the coefficients on old-age dependency rates. Across all four
models the test statistics reject the null hypothesis of constant coefficients for all
three regimes.
We believe the positive coefficient on old-age dependency rates is largely at-
tributed to a country having a larger share of consumption. Further, we suspect
these countries also have the ability to borrow abroad. Looking at Table 13 we can
see countries with lower saving rates have significantly higher consumption rates
and an average current account balance of -5.5 percent of GDP. It is also impor-
tant to note that the average GDP growth rate for these countries is 1.4 percent
which is significantly lower than the average GDP growth rate of 2.6 percent for
the higher saving countries. Some countries in the lowest saving regime are Greece
(1982-2007), United Kingdom (1972-2007), and United States (1982-1987).
Comparing the coefficients on old-age dependency rates between the second,
-0.012, and third, -0.043, regimes suggests a slightly different story. Both regimes
have a large number of observations, consumption rates are higher for the lower
saving regime but GDP growth is slightly higher for the higher saving regime. For
countries in the second regime, those with saving rates between 16.5% and 24.2%,
it will take an 83 percent increase in the old-age dependency rates for GDP growth
rates to fall by one percentage point. The United States is currently in the second
regime and is expecting an 84 percent increase in old-age dependency rates. For
the highest saving regime it will only take an increase of 23 percent in the old-age
dependency rates to reduce growth by one percentage point.
4.3 Thresholds in Current Account
The next step is to analyze how an increase in old-age dependency rates affects
GDP growth conditional on a country’s current account balance. Controlling for
thresholds in a country’s current account balance allows for a better understanding
on how access to foreign financial markets will impact the effects of population
ageing on growth. Following from Cutler et al (1990), Elmendorf and Sheiner
(2000), and Guest (2006) we expect coefficients on old-age dependency rates for
countries with current account deficits to be similar to the results found for the low
saving countries. Results for the threshold tests are presented in Table 7. All four
models reject the null hypothesis of no threshold effect at the one percent level.
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The threshold occurs at the 29th percentile with a current account value of -0.014.
There are 294 observations in the regime associated with large current account
deficits and 520 observations in the regime for countries that run current account
surpluses. Similar to saving rates, there is evidence to suggest a second threshold
is present. Tests for a second threshold show models (1) and (4) reject the null
hypothesis of one threshold at the one and ten percent levels, respectively. Models
(2) and (3) fail to reject the null hypothesis. Models (1) and (2) find the second
threshold at the 82nd percentile with a value of 0.041, but models (3) and (4)
find the second threshold at the 8th percentile with a value of -0.078. To maintain
consistency across models we assume there are two threshold effects in a country’s
current account balance.
Regression results for the double threshold model are presented in Table 8.
Unlike the saving threshold regressions, the optimal threshold values are not con-
sistent across models. This makes it difficult to compare across models. In models
(1) and (2) the thresholds occur at 29th and 82nd percentiles. There are 294
observations in regime one (current account deficits), 379 observations in regime
two (current account balances around zero), and 141 observations in regime three
(large current account surpluses). For these models, the coefficient on old-age de-
pendency rates is positive and significant for regimes one and three. In other words,
an increase in the old-age dependency rate will have a positive effect on growth
rates for countries with a current account deficit larger than -0.014 percent of GDP
or a current account surplus in excess of 0.041 percent of GDP.
Because of the differences in the optimal threshold values we cannot com-
pare directly across models. Models (3) and (4) have thresholds at the 8th and
29th percentiles. There are 62 observations in the first regime (large current ac-
count deficits), 232 observations in the second regime (moderate current account
deficits), and 520 observations in the third regime (current account surpluses). For
countries in the first regime the coefficient on old-age dependency rates is positive
and significant at the five percent level. The coefficient on old-age is positive but
insignificant for the second regime. Finally, the coefficient on old-age dependency
rates for the third regime is negative and significant at the one percent level. The
F-tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of equality across the coefficients on
old-age. Across all four models the additionally explanatory variables appear with
the same signs and similar magnitudes as the baseline regressions in Table 3.
It is a fairly safe to assume many of these countries in the first regime also have
low saving rates. Looking at Table 13 we can see specifically for model (4) the av-
erage saving rate for the first regime is 0.170 compared with 0.255 in the third
regime. Despite the large deviation in saving rates and current account balances,
growth rates are nearly identical across regimes. Countries with low domestic sav-
ing rates have larger current account deficits which shows they have access to
foreign capital markets allowing them sustain GDP growth in light of substan-
tial increases in the old-age dependency rates. These countries have lower saving
rates which allow them to increase domestic consumption, but more importantly
can rely on foreign investment to offset the negative effects on GDP growth rates
caused by the decline in worker productivity.
Table 9 displays the countries within each regime. Countries in the first regime
(high current account deficits) include Greece (1982-2007), Iceland (2005-2007),
and Portugal (1997-2007). Prior to the financial crisis all three countries were
able to sustain current account deficits but recently have found foreign financing
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difficult to obtain. Countries in the second regime include Australia (1997-2007),
New Zealand (2004-2007), Spain (2000-2007), United Kingdom (1998-2007), and
United States (1983-2007). Prior to the financial crisis all five of these countries
had fairly sound finances and access to foreign capital markets. This seems to be
especially true for the United States. One reason the effects of ageing on GDP
growth may be minimized for the United States dependents on their access to
cheap foreign capital. Being able to borrow at low interest rates will allow the
United States to increase domestic consumption or fund retirement programs at
extremely low costs. Of course, these results hinge on the state of a country’s
fiscal balances. Recently Greece, Iceland, and Portugal have all needed some form
of a bailout following the financial collapse in 2007. Barring a Greek tragedy, the
United States should be able to minimize the negative impact associated with a
drastic increase in the old-age dependency ratios by maintaining an open channel
for foreign investment.
4.4 Thresholds in Trade Openness
After controlling for thresholds in domestic saving rates and current account bal-
ances we have shown the coefficient on old-age dependency rates to vary greatly.
The coefficient is positive for countries with low saving rates and current account
deficits, but negative for countries with a high savings rate and current account
surpluses. The next step in our analysis is to analyze how the coefficient changes
conditional on measures of trade openness.11 We expect the coefficient on old-age
dependency rates to be negative and larger in absolute value for countries that
are relatively closed. Countries that are more open have greater access to financial
markets and can resort to foreign investment to maintain higher levels of GDP
growth.
The results for the threshold tests are reported in Table 10. For the case of
one threshold, all four models strongly reject the null hypothesis of no thresholds.
The threshold occurs at the 35th percentile with a value of 0.505. There are 289
observations in the first regime (relative closed countries) and 525 countries in
the second regime (relative open countries). We also find evidence of a second
threshold. Models (1), and (2) reject the null of a double threshold at the five
percent level, while the test statistics for models (3) and (4) lie just outside the
ten percent critical value. The second threshold occurs at the 21st percentile with
an openness value of 0.420. This suggests the coefficient on old-age dependency
rates is unique for closed countries (regime 1), relatively closed countries (regime
2), and relatively more open countries (regime 3). There are 207 observations in
the first regime, 112 observations in the second regime, and 525 observations in
the third regime.
The regression results for the double threshold model are presented in Table
11. The coefficient on old-age dependency rates for regime one is negative and
significant at the five percent level for model (4) and the ten percent level in
models (1) and (3). Interestingly, the coefficient is also negative and significant
for the second regime. The coefficient is larger in absolute value for the regime
11 We also tested the model for thresholds in the financial openness measure, there was
evidence of one threshold. The results were similar in that more financial closed countries had
a negative coefficient on old-age dependency rates.
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two. The coefficient in the first regime ranges from -0.005 in model (2) to -0.037
in model (4). The coefficient in the second regime ranges from -0.049 in model
(2) and -0.079 in model (4). As expected the coefficient is significantly smaller
for the more open countries. The coefficient for the third regime is positive but
statistically insignificant from zero in models (1) and (2), the coefficient becomes
negative in models (3) and (4) but is statistically insignificant from zero. The F-
test for equality across coefficients rejects the hypothesis that the coefficients are
equal, although the level of significance falls to ten percent for the coefficients on
old-age dependency rates in regimes two and three. It is also worth noting that
countries in regimes one and three have similar average GDP growth, savings rate,
and current account balances (see table 13).
Countries with a high level of trade openness are both net debtor and creditor
countries. Although, the results are consistent with our previous example, we are
unable to jointly control for a high level of trade openness and low saving rates
and/or a current account deficit. For example, countries in the relatively more
open group include countries that were also in the high current account deficit
regime: Greece (1997-2007), Portugal (1997-2007), and Iceland (1971-20007) and
the low saving regime: Greece (1982-2007) and United Kingdom (1972-2007), while
countries in the current account surplus regime are also considered open. Some of
these countries include Canada (1979-2007), New Zealand (1974-2007), and many
other European countries. Further, many countries are also jointly in the high
saving and more open regimes. For a complete list of countries by regime see table
12. Countries in regime one (lowest measures of trade openness) include Australia
(1971-2007), Japan (1971-2007), and United States (1971-2007).
Our results show that countries with a low domestic savings rate, moderate cur-
rent account deficits, and are more open to trade will be more prepared to handle
the upcoming shift in population demographics. By no means are we suggesting
countries should lower their saving rates, countries with lower saving rates also
have significantly lower GDP growth rates. Further, a low domestic savings rate
and large current account deficits could result in serious financial repercussion.
This is especially true for countries with large levels of government debt.
4.5 Country Cases
The United States has a relatively low domestic savings rate and high current
account deficits. In our model we show these factors will allow the United States
to sustain a stable growth rate, and perhaps increase GDP growth rates, with
the coming retirement of the baby boomer generation. The reasoning is fairly
straightforward, countries with a low savings rate are able to sustain a higher level
of consumption while being able to borrow from foreign sources. Of course, one
needs to account for potential shifts in investor preferences. Three other coun-
tries, Greece, Iceland, and Portugal also had high current account deficits, but
unfortunately following the financial crisis in 2007 these countries had difficulty
retaining foreign capital and ultimately needed emergency lending. In order for
the United States to minimize the effects of an ageing population it is imperative
for the United States to maintain creditworthiness in the eyes of foreign investors.
With the coming retirement boom countries with a relatively lower savings
rate that are more open and have access to foreign capital markets might be
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best in terms of sustaining GDP growth rates. These countries include France,
New Zealand, Spain, and the United Kingdom. France, New Zealand, and Spain
appear in the second regime for saving rates (moderate saving), second regime for
current account balances (moderate deficit), and third regime for openness (fairly
open). The only difference for United Kingdom is that they are in the lowest
saving regime. The low savings rate, combine with high foreign investment could
potentially position the United Kingdom to sustain current growth rates despite a
large increase in old-age dependency rates on the horizon. The ultimate outcome
for these countries comes down to the desire for high saving countries to continue
financing low saving countries.
5 Conclusion
The effects of an increase in old-age dependency rates will create substantial shifts
in GDP growth rates across nearly every OECD country. Understanding the ef-
fects of an increase in old-age dependency rates on GDP growth is imperative for
policymakers to prepare for the shift. Using a non-dynamic panel threshold effects
procedure following Hansen (1999) we isolate the effects of an increase in old-age
dependency rates on GDP growth conditional on a country’s savings rate, current
account balance, and level of trade openness.
As it stands, countries with a moderate current account deficit and lower sav-
ings rate are in the best position to absorb the demographic shift as many countries
experience a near doubling of their old-age dependency rates. This ultimately leads
to a bigger question outside the scope of our paper: Will countries that are cur-
rently running a current account surplus shift into deficit countries or will they
continue to finance the spending of countries current running large deficits (Aus-
tralia, United Kingdom, and the United States). This will ultimately determine
the effects of an increase in old-age dependency rates on GDP growth rates. Stan-
dard economic theory suggests net savers will sell off financial assets and become
debtors when labor forces shift into old-age. For countries with a current account
deficit the effects of an increase in the old-age dependency rates will depend on
their ability to retaining foreign financing and whether creditor countries will con-
tinue to finance net debtors. For many of these countries they might be well suited
to increase domestic saving and use the saving to offset the loss in productivity
under population ageing.
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Table 3 Regression Results - Baseline Models
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
log(ageworking)it 0.097
(2.255)
log(ageold)it -0.016 -0.001 -0.027 -0.033
(1.348) (0.105) (1.849) (2.123)
log(ageyoung)it -0.039 -0.033 -0.043 -0.052
(2.518) (2.173) (2.299) (2.748)
log(1 + labor force growth)it 0.221 0.220 0.179 0.179 0.174
(2.564) (2.555) (2.292) (2.228) (2.188)
log(per capita income)i,t−1 -0.023 -0.029 -0.054 -0.067 -0.057
(4.553) (4.127) (6.245) (6.029) (4.551)
log(1 + population growth)it -0.965 -0.962 -1.038 -1.038 -1.135
(2.883) (2.777) (2.858) (2.396) (2.564)
log(S/Y )i,t−1 0.021 0.023 0.014 0.018 0.016
(2.152) (2.384) (1.478) (1.819) (1.564)
log(G/Y )i,t−1 -0.018 -0.020 -0.025 -0.020 -0.017
(1.419) (1.519) (1.952) (1.673) (1.432)
Trade Opennessit 0.040 0.036 0.043
(3.664) (3.298) (3.777)
Financial Opennessit 0.002 0.001 0.001
(2.597) (1.513) (0.906)
log(life expectancy)it 0.280 0.404
(3.082) (3.909)
Primary School Enrollmentit -0.008 -0.005
(0.395) (0.244)
Mortality Rate below age fiveit 0.101 0.106
(1.634) (1.671)








Constant -0.181 0.441 0.642 -0.356 -0.969
(1.201) (3.408) (4.586) (0.998) (2.118)
N 814 814 814 814 814
R2 0.0945 0.0969 0.1399 0.1587 0.1714
White standard errors are calculated, absolute t-values in parentheses
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Table 5 Regression Results - Threshold Saving Rates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
log(ageold)itI(sit < γ1) 0.109 0.132 0.126 0.117
(4.316) (5.284) (4.832) (4.328)
log(ageold)itI(γ1 < sit ≤ γ2) 0.007 0.024 -0.005 -0.012
(0.425) (1.522) (0.263) (0.658)
log(ageold)itI(γ2 < sit) -0.018 -0.003 -0.038 -0.043
(1.439) (0.233) (2.546) (2.840)
log(ageyoung)it -0.014 -0.004 -0.023 -0.029
(0.929) (0.295) (1.333) (1.654)
log(1 + labor force growth)it 0.243 0.202 0.198 0.200
(4.979) (4.210) (4.109) (4.149)
log(per capita income)i,t−1 -0.022 -0.047 -0.052 -0.050
(3.220) (5.734) (5.196) (4.874)
log(1 + population growth)it -0.789 -0.812 -0.697 -0.772
(3.892) (3.820) (2.864) (3.125)
log(S/Y )i,t−1 0.021 0.012 0.014 0.012
(3.575) (2.028) (2.250) (2.052)
log(G/Y )i,t−1 -0.014 -0.018 -0.009 -0.006
(1.459) (1.877) (0.932) (0.630)
(Exportsit + Importsit)/GDPit 0.046 0.044 0.046
(4.715) (4.397) (4.510)
Financial Openness 1.27E-03 2.94E-04 1.23E-04
(2.117) (0.453) (0.184)
log(life expectancy)it 3.70E-03 3.76E-03
(3.699) (3.738)
Primary School Enrollment(t) 0.008 0.009
(0.379) (0.418)
Mortality Rate below age five(t) 0.185 0.180
(4.684) (4.489)








N 814 814 814 814
R2 0.1336 0.1800 0.2115 0.2148
Ftest β0 = β1 20.55*** 23.51*** 33.23*** 31.46***
Ftest β1 = β2 3.77* 4.69** 6.99*** 6.02**
Ftest β0 = β2 32.90*** 38.45*** 51.93*** 47.91***
White standard errors are calculated, absolute t-values in parentheses
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 8 Regression Results - Threshold Current Account Balance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
log(ageold)itI(cait < γ1) 0.018 0.047 0.064 0.059
(1.104) (2.804) (2.717) (2.321)
log(ageold)itI(γ1 < cait ≤ γ2) -0.030 -0.010 0.014 0.010
(2.432) (0.836) (0.729) (0.512)
log(ageold)itI(γ2 < cait) 0.043 0.024 -0.039 -0.042
(1.999) (1.134) (2.590) (2.748)
log(ageyoung)i,t−1 -0.032 -0.019 -0.036 -0.038
(2.185) (1.352) (2.128) (2.133)
log(1 + labor force growth)it 0.209 0.170 0.172 0.177
(4.273) (3.531) (3.532) (3.633)
log(per capita income)i,t−1 -0.031 -0.056 -0.063 -0.064
(4.428) (6.787) (6.359) (6.249)
log(1 + population growth)it -0.958 -1.039 -1.016 -1.066
(4.772) (4.965) (4.165) (4.301)
log(S/Y )i,t−1 0.021 0.013 0.015 0.014
(3.714) (2.236) (2.571) (2.377)
log(G/Y )i,t−1 -0.024 -0.031 -0.026 -0.023
(2.405) (3.202) (2.565) (2.225)
(Exportsit + Importsit)/GDPit 0.041 0.045 0.048
(4.085) (4.411) (4.575)
Financial Openness 1.60E-03 5.69E-04 5.94E-04
(2.656) (0.863) (0.876)
log(life expectancy)it 4.24E-03 4.17E-03
(4.151) (4.059)
Primary School Enrollment(t) 0.007 0.005
(0.312) (0.209)
Mortality Rate below age five(t) 0.186 0.186
(4.475) (4.341)








N 814 814 814 814
R2 0.1225 0.1632 0.1913 0.1946
Ftest β0 = β1 15.04*** 21.77*** 5.93** 5.38**
Ftest β0 = β2 12.60*** 2.70 14.83*** 13.97***
Ftest β1 = β2 1.30 1.00 26.22*** 22.88***
White standard errors are calculated, absolute t-values in parentheses
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28 Ryan W. Herzog, Brandon Reeves
Table 11 Regression Results - Threshold Trade Openness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
log(ageold)itI(openit < γ1) -0.022 -0.005 -0.029 -0.037
-(1.751) -(0.391) -(1.831) -(2.319)
log(ageold)itI(γ1 < openit ≤ γ2) -0.064 -0.049 -0.072 -0.079
-(3.400) -(2.606) -(3.232) -(3.702)
log(ageold)itI(γ2 < openit) 0.015 0.020 -0.004 -0.013
(1.008) (1.350) -(0.214) -(0.693)
log(ageyoung)i,t−1 -0.037 -0.033 -0.040 -0.050
-(2.604) -(2.337) -(2.329) -(2.843)
log(1 + labor force growth)it 0.231 0.190 0.190 0.195
(4.711) (3.905) (3.848) (3.952)
log(per capita income)i,t−1 -0.030 -0.053 -0.064 -0.066
-(4.397) -(6.489) -(6.310) -(6.300)
log(1 + population growth)it -1.113 -1.149 -1.077 -1.207
-(5.471) -(5.399) -(4.396) -(4.897)
log(S/Y )i,t−1 0.021 0.014 0.017 0.016
(3.636) (2.427) (2.815) (2.645)
log(G/Y )i,t−1 -0.023 -0.027 -0.022 -0.019
-(2.382) -(2.808) -(2.166) -(1.889)
(Exportsit + Importsit)/GDPit 0.036 0.032 0.033
(3.630) (3.113) (3.180)
Financial Openness 1.43E-03 9.60E-04 7.82E-04
(2.368) (1.465) (1.155)
log(life expectancy)it 3.12E-03 3.03E-03
(3.015) (2.909)
Primary School Enrollment(t) -0.004 -0.002
-(0.172) -(0.097)
Mortality Rate below age five(t) 0.090 0.074
(2.288) (1.845)








N 814 814 814 814
R2 0.1225 0.1568 0.1715 0.1805
Ftest β0 = β1 5.90** 6.75*** 4.93** 5.52**
Ftest β0 = β2 21.05*** 16.28*** 12.58*** 14.34***
Ftest β1 = β2 8.85*** 3.90** 3.65* 3.25*
White standard errors are calculated, absolute t-values in parentheses
*, **, *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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